arxiv
PublishedJune 1, 2026 at 4:00 AM
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Revisiting the Bertrand Paradox via Equilibrium Analysis of No-regret Learners
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arXiv:2602.21620v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has $n \ge 2$ players who simultaneously choose prices from the set $\{1/k, 2/k, \ldots, 1\}$, where $k\in\mathbb{N}$. The player who sets the lowest
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