arxiv
PublishedSeptember 18, 2026 at 4:00 AM
—neutral
Efficient Nash Equilibrium Computation for Cybersecurity Games
Publisher summary· verbatim
arXiv:2609.19399v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Computing Nash equilibria of simulation-based cybersecurity games with policy-space response oracles (PSRO) is bottlenecked by payoff estimation: every payoff-matrix entry costs Monte-Carlo rollouts of a slow simulator, while policies and restricted-
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Originally published on arxiv ↗