arxiv
PublishedOctober 15, 2026 at 4:00 AM
Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
Publisher summary· verbatim
arXiv:2610.18625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Relying on manipulable characteristics to target the allocation of resources is fraught with difficulties. Naively optimal rules lead to falsification and allocative inefficiency. Optimizing the rule for allocative efficiency while accounting for fal
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Originally published on arxiv ↗