arxiv
PublishedJuly 14, 2026 at 4:00 AM
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Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational
Publisher summary· verbatim
arXiv:2510.14907v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly, i
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Originally published on arxiv ↗