arxiv
PublishedJune 17, 2026 at 4:00 AM
—neutral
Learning in Matching Games with Bandit Feedback
Publisher summary· verbatim
arXiv:2506.03802v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match. Specifically, we consider a setting in which matched agents engage in zero-sum games with initially unknown payoff
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Originally published on arxiv ↗